There’s nothing new about corruption in Washington. Lately, there isn’t much new about corruption on the Bench, either. Using Incorporation Doctrine to unlawfully impose marital law onto the states on a federal level, is just one of many examples of contemporary judicial overstepping. The Court must have forgotten that marriage, which was historically a matter left to the states, has never been and cannot lawfully be read into constitutional law. Regulating and requiring every American to purchase a federal healthcare plan, by somehow finding basis for this in the Commerce Clause, is yet, another tragic modern example of this form of federal overreach.  With this lawless executive overreach as rampant as the Black Plague , it is the moral duty of the people to step up and put the Tyrant in the White House on a leash. Article V of the U.S. Constitution allows for such change via a convention: “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress…”
In light of Article V, Justice Antonin Scalia remarked the following: “Part of the problem as I have noted is simply that the Congress has become professionalized; its members have a greater interest than ever before in remaining in office; and it is served by a bureaucracy and is much more subject to the power of individualized pressure groups than to the unorganized feelings of the majority of the citizens. This and other factors have created a real feeling of disenfranchisement that I think has a proper basis. The one remedy specifically provided for in the Constitution is the amendment process that bypasses the Congress. I would like to see that amendment process used just once. I do not much care what it is used for the first time, but using it once will exert an enormous influence on both the Congress and the Supreme Court. It will establish the parameters of what can be done and how, and after that the Congress and the Court will behave much better…”  His endorsement for the Convention of States project is not an isolated one, but one which is echoed in many of Justice Scalia’s opinions and dissents.
A striking parallel to the Convention of States exists in Jewish jurisprudence. While only the Jewish Supreme Court was able to adjudicate all aspects of the law, specifically; capital punishment, skin disease diagnoses, and various Temple related laws , the various Circuit Courts of Israel were able to render decisions on most criminal, civil, monetary, and ritual matters. As history would have it, the reason for this purely political: the Tora leaves the supreme law of the land geographically bound. The last word on all matters is to come from select judges from a select location: “And you shall come to the Levitical priests, or to the judge serving in those days, and you shall make your inquiry, and they will relate to you the matter of judgment. And you shall act according to the matter that they relate to you from the place that The Lord chooses, and be vigilant to do according to all that they instruct you.”  So long as the Temple stood, judicial review on all national matters was properly executed with complete clarity to the people. An anecdotal restatement of this reality was stated by the 2nd century jurist par excellence, R. Jose : “Originally, there were not many disputes in Israel, but one court of seventy-one members sat in the Hall of Hewn Stones , and two courts of twenty-three sat, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount and one at the door of the Court, and other courts of twenty-three sat in all cities of Israel. If a matter of inquiry arose, the local court was consulted. If they had a precedent [to rely on], they stated it; if not, they went to the nearest court. If they had a precedent, they stated it; if not, they went to the one situated at the entrance of the Court, and he declared, “Thus I have expounded, and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught and thus have they taught.” If they had a precedent, they stated it, and if not, they all proceeded to the Hall of Hewn Stones, where they (Sanhedrin) sat from the [period of the] morning offering, until the evening offering. On the Sabbath and festivals, they sat within the outer gate.  The question was then put before them; if they had a precedent, they stated it; if not, they took a vote: if the majority voted “unclean” they declared it so; if “clean” they ruled so. But when the disciples of Shammai and Hillel, who had insufficiently studied, increased in number, disputes multiplied in Israel, and the law became as two laws.”
As R. Jose points out, subsequent generations did not adhere to the principles of national unity under the law. Although “insufficient study” is a bit of an ambiguous reason offered for the prolonged indecisiveness of the courts , it is clear that various legal schools, or Circuit Courts of the post Second Temple era, did not find it to be of interest to re-establish the old federal system of government. For a number of generations, there was no nationally binding legal body, leaving authorized jurists (Musmakhim) to opine on undefined laws, and to institute their own by-laws. For example, the law that one must circumcise a boy on the 8th day after his birth, even if the 8th day falls on the Sabbath, is in accordance with the view of R. Aqiva (Shabbat 19:1), but one may not prepare materials that violate Sabbath laws to do so. However, “in R. Eliezer’s locale, they would chop wood to make charcoal to form iron [to make a knife for a circumcision that fell] on the Sabbath. Similarly, “in the locale of R. Jose the Galilean, they would eat poultry with milk.” 
Likewise, with regard to the status of permissibility of certain pots on Passover, the Talmud (Pesaḥim 30a) relates that the law prohibited them in the locale of the jurist, Rav, as this was his locale. Further dissecting the unforeseen consequences that arise with no national consensus, the jurist, Abaye (c. 278-338 CE), notes that the prohibition against creating legal factions does not apply to two different legal schools operating in two different locales.  Occasionally, post Second Temple courts would form an assembly and formally vote on legal matters , however, this was rare and often was the cause of much political turmoil. So great was the political urge of various schools at the time, that the school of Shammai would impede voting on cases until they reached a majority in seating, only to stealthily adjudicate cases then. 
Subsequent development of the voting process eventually led back to the formation of the last Jewish National Court; the court of Ravina and Rav Ashé. Unlike the court of Judah the Prince, which oversaw the publication of the Mishna, the court of Ravina and R. Ashé was able to vote on every last matter of law that was hitherto unsettled. As Maimonides states: “He [Judah the Prince] gathered together all the precedents, all the enactments, and all the explanations and interpretations that had been heard from Moses our Teacher, or those that had been deduced by the courts of all the generations in all matters of the Law; and he compiled the Mishna from all of them. And he recited it in public, and it became revealed to all Israel; everyone wrote it down, and he taught it everywhere, so that the oral law would not be forgotten by Israel.” The two-stage process of legal authority rests in an authorized court; to compile the legal material it has archived, and to have the public accept it.  However, as Maimonides states, Judah the Prince did not adjudicate the cases he recorded. They were simply restated in an organized fashion, lest “the oral law would not be forgotten by Israel.” However, through the “thousands and myriads” gathering twice a year to ratify the totality of the Law, R. Ashé put an end to subsequent legal advancement: “After the court of R. Ashé, who compiled the Talmud in the time of his son, and ratified it, the people of Israel were scattered throughout all the lands, a great scattering, and reached the most remote parts and distant isles; and armed struggle became prevalent in the world, and the public ways became clogged with armies. The study of the Law declined, and the people of Israel ceased to gather in places of study in their thousands and myriads as they had before.” 
As in the case of Judah the Prince, I believe that R. Ashé had the people vote and ratify the law due to forecasted persecution, in line with Maimonides’ historical reports of the post-Talmudic era. Thus, there seems to be recurring trend between local and federal jurisdiction. So long as the nation is geographically and politically stable, Jewish jurists did not take issue with ruling on matters for their local people. However, as described above, a strong federal representation of the law was deemed necessary in order to unite the people in times of persecution and dispersion. Unfortunately, the nature of this flexibility in legal structure is unknown to most, leaving R. Sherira Gaon (c. 906-1006), President of the Academy of Pumbedita, to clarify as follows : “…and they [the court of R. Ashé] inferred [via judicial rhetoric] various inferences [from the Mishna], and added discussions [of their reasoning] and new ones from later jurists. And it is not that the former jurists did not know [of their reasoning], rather, they left a place for future generations to define them.” This right of “leaving a place for us to define”, is what lead to the ratification of the Talmud as we know it. 
At first glance, it might seem that the Jewish convention of the Court to vote on matters, is diametrically opposed to the Convention of States against the federal government. However, the opposite seems to be the reality, while simultaneously achieving the same goal. I suppose it is not unreasonable to assume an unconscious drive; pushing the Founders toward living according to the old Hebrew Commonwealth, after all.
 See especially Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting), King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an accurate and textually loyal reading of the Commerce Clause, see United States v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
 Governor McCrory’s battle with the DOJ and Senator Tom Cotton’s persevering battle with the Obama Administration’s lawless relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, are but a few examples that come to mind: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/nc-sues-doj-bathroom-law/481845/. https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=466.
 Further remarks of endorsement from Justice Scalia may be found here: http://www.conventionofstates.com/justice_antonin_article_v_convention. Perhaps the Justice did not suggest implementing Nullification (as proposed in Cooper v. Aaron) for diplomatic and practical reasons.
 See Sanhedrin 52b: “so long as there are Priests [serving] there is [capital] punishment, if there are no priests [serving], there is no [capital] punishment. See Rashi ibid (s.v veta’a). While the Geonim (Shaaré Teshuva #176, P. 18) believe that skin disease cases are not dealt with without the Temple, Maimonides, in his Mishne Tora (Laws of Tumat Ṣara’at 11§6), disagrees.
 Deu. 17:9-10. This “place” is the Temple in Jerusalem; Compare to 2 Chron. 16.
 Sanhedrin 88b.
 Maimonides (ibid: Laws of Mamrim 1§1) is keen to label the Court of this location as the “trunk” of the oral law, consequently leaving all other courts as “branches”, as is made clear from R. Jose’s statement.
 As per the Talmud’s (Qiddushin 35a) likening of Tefillin to documents of the Temple archives, it becomes clear why Tefillin are not worn on the Sabbath and festivals.
 Maimonides (s.v shoresh) demonstrates that the students of Shammai and Hillel lacked the judicial reasoning of their teachers, likely due to increased persecution of that era: http://www.daat.ac.il/he-il/mahshevet-israel/yesod/rambam/ben-maimon-hakdama.htm?printview=true. This view is in concurrence with earlier traditions, as stated in Iggeret Sherira Gaon (Mishor edi., P.223).
 Shabbat 130a, Yevamot 14a. Both these positions were contrary to the normative practice, but could not be outlawed, as the Supreme Court did not stand to arrive at a formal decision.
 See Yevamot 13b for further background. Abaye’s view is correctly restated by Maimonides (ibid: Laws of Avoda Zara 12§18).
 Case examples may be found in Yadayim 4:1-4, Qiddushin 53a, Makkot 21b. See also Bava Meṣia 59b for an infamously dramatic political outcome of formally voting.
 See Maimonides’ Perush Ha’mishnayot to Shabbat: 1:3 (Qafiḥ edi., P. 11) for a full elaboration.
 Introduction to Mishne Tora (#14). This view is also stated in Iggeret Sherira Gaon (P.167-169). Maimonides (Perush Ha’mishnayot: P.9) makes a distinction between perushim mequbalim (per curiam decisions), which are recorded precedents that predate the destruction of the Temple, and decisions derived via judicial rhetoric by Musmakhim. Of special note, Maimonides states that the Palestinian Talmud was only “compiled”, but never nationally ratified, hence R. Abahu (Palestinian Talmud: Bikkurim 3a) dissenting on an explicit Mishna.
 Ibid (#30). This massive bi-annual voting ceremony was known as the Yarḥé Kalla. See here for further discussion: http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/9163-kallah.
 Ibid (P.231).
 Rashbam (Pesaḥim 101b, s.v likbe’e) notes that this right extends to jurists who were not Musmakhim. While the premise of such a notion, in context, is likely incorrect (R. Jonathon was likely a Musmakh), it would explain why Maimonides rests the power of the Babylonian Talmud in “the acceptance of the people”, rather than in formal judicial right or authority. For similar comments, see Laws of R. Asher (Berakhot: 3:35).