One of the most amazing things about reading any text is how two individuals, both educated and well versed in the art of critical reading and interpretation, will arrive at two totally different interpretations of the given text. Age old debates between Jews and Christians have stemmed from this topic alone. Muslims around the globe are divided on fundamental issues of theology and law due to this one issue. What is binding, why is it binding, and how is it made binding? What is the driving force that leads adherents of a particular legal system, faith, or philosophy, to do what they do? Christians through faith in Jesus,  Muslims through their respective appointed successors over Muhammad, Americans through their political differences, and so on.
Simplifying an overly complex legal philosophy, the school of originalism may serve as a starting point to illustrate one side of the coin. Originalists argue that textual interpretation is bound to the grammar, context, and reasonable intent of the authors who composed the text in question. Thus, proponents of originalism argue that the job of justices is to interpret the Constitution, or any legal text, in this manner. Superimposing any form of interpretation outside the confines of these three basic principles is not only not the job of the justice, but is a form of judicial tyranny.  The main reason for such sentiments is because originalism is the only way to preserve the rule of law, and in particular to constrain discretionary judicial authority. Without the constraints of set rules and canons of interpretation, justices can rule as they please, superimposing interpretations unfounded in the text, on to the text. In reality, the proposal, passing, and promulgation of law is the job of the Legislative branch of the U.S. government, as is laid out in sections 7 and 8 of article 1 in the U.S. Constitution.  If changes need to be made to extant statues, or the Constitution itself, Congress can reform accordingly, but that is not the enumerated right of the Judiciary. Others argue that it is impractical and overly time consuming to amend or repeal outdated and unfavorable laws. Why can’t the Judiciary just reinterpret to match the desired legal outcome? After all, the Supreme Court’s rulings are the de-facto law of the land, arguably leaving them with the most power out of any other branch of government. 
Having said all this, I would like to focus on the place of originalism in biblical interpretation. It is unclear how the Law of Moses and works of the Prophets ought to be interpreted. There is no uniform tradition, or guiding set of principles that all schools of thought agree upon, not even the very text of the bible.  However, a line must be drawn somewhere. Within the frame of the Masoretic text, it remains unclear what peshat, or the “plain” or “simple” reading is. For example, when reading the King James Bible, one will encounter the word myriad occasionally. To the modern reader, this is synonymous with many, or a large sum, while KJV English uses the word specifically to refer to 10,000. Likewise, the word girl once meant a child or lad of either sex.  Many examples of this kind exist, but one thing is clear; our own projections and cultural biases inevitably play a role in the way we read and comprehend material. Even among Jews, terms like People of the land once referred to the elite noblemen of society, but as early as the Mishnaic era, was used to refer to the unlearned everyman.  With the aforementioned in mind, it may be asked: what exactly is the plain, or simple reading of the biblical text?
Among many issues, Rabbinic and Karaite Jews rarely disagree on what biblical verses actually mean. At least to the best of my knowledge, it is difficult to find fundamental differences between interpretations made in Aaron ben Elijah’s commentary and Abraham Ibn Ezra’s commentary to the Torah. In fact, Ibn Ezra refers to Karaite opinions quite often. The only exception to this rule is Ibn Ezra’s view of binding vs. non-binding peshat. Despite his harsh criticism of them, Ibn Ezra does not fundamentally have a problem with Karaite non-legal interpretations of verses. He makes this clear in his introduction to the Torah, where he voices opposition against the Karaites, on the grounds that they do not adhere to the “Minters of the Law.”  Implicitly, and most obvious to anyone familiar with Ibn Ezra’s writings, non-legal material is not the issue at hand, as the Torah  does not restrict this.  As far as legal material is concerned, the root of the dispute boils down to just one point: judicial authority.
Until today, no one has yet outlined exactly how the biblical judicial system was set up (based on verses alone), and to whom were select areas of the law given to interpret and adjudicate. Priests and other tribe members seemed to have both played integral roles as teachers and judges of the law. There appears to have been a class of professional judges, perhaps royally appointed. Throughout the ancient Near East, the king was assumed to be responsible for the administration of justice, but in practical terms, he could scarcely have been involved in day-to-day judicial decisions. One gets the impression from some of the narrative episodes that he operated as a kind of court of appeals.  Nonetheless, by the Second Temple era, there is documentation of a supreme court known as the Sanhedrin. What is interesting about this institution is that it united the priestly, judicial, and legislative branches. Lower courts would be bound to what the Sanhedrin rules on all Torah matters,  and local courts would judge all other local matters of dispute. Why then, should one erroneously assume that the recorded case laws found in redacted form in rabbinic literature, are “fabricated by man?” While much is unknown about the legal procedures of the Sadducees, one source seems to indicate that even they subscribed to the Sanhedrin.  Even so, Karaites claim (based on Deu. 17:10) that a Sanhedrin outside the realm of the Temple has no legal authority. This confident assumption is not without foundation , but it is also not explicit in the Text. In fact, there is precedent to show that the Sanhedrin is not geographically bound. After the destruction, the Sanhedrin was re-established in 10 different locations outside the Temple , roughly until 400-425 CE, with R. Gamliel VI as the last head of the Court.
It is perhaps for this reason that the Sadducees did not adhere to the peshat set forth by the Sanhedrin. Unlike the Sadducees, the Pharisees formally established what the peshat is for legal purposes.  For better or for worse, the original intention, or literal understanding of the text seemed to be of little concern to the Pharisees. The Hebrew language itself cannot be decoded without user input and change. It is the job of the reader to process the unvocalized words and paragraphs, and process them into intelligible words with meaning. A uniform, or “true” interpretation, as mentioned above, is simply not a function of the language. Even if an individual interprets a law in line with his honest and sincere understanding, it is not the right of the individual to be the arbiter of that.  It is the function of collective people to give the text meaning, hence the term in Hebrew “ha’qore ba’sefer”- one who reads ‘with’ the scroll, but not the scroll itself.  The Targum serves as a text by which the legal peshat is read to the public.  These Aramaic renditions of the text were read in conjunction with the weekly Torah reading. The practice of translating the scriptural portion into Aramaic may be as old as ritual Torah reading itself, the precedent being found at Neḥ. 8:8 in the account of Ezra’s reading at the Water. 
Firstly, the Targum translated the biblical Hebrew unfamiliar to the laymen at the time, in to common Aramaic. It clarified ambiguous words, phrases, apparent anthropomorphisms,  and most importantly, the laws.  So important was the transmission of legal definitions, that cantors of the Targum would be censored and ask to correct their renditions if it was not in line with what the Court set as the standard peshat of the text.  I suppose that with time, an authorized court can adjust the Targum appropriately, hence the various versions of Targum for different locales and times.
Lastly, the belief that peshat is defined as original intent was first introduced by the medieval Franco-German commentators of the bible. Commentators such as Rashbam, Rashi, Ramban, Joseph Bekhor Shor, and Joseph Kara, all made use of literal and textual interpretations for all matters of biblical interpretation. Granted, they did not deviate from rabbinic law, their approach is unfounded in the rabbinic literature that preceded them. Why that is, remains a subject of debate among historians, although the general consensus seems to be that textualism served as a successful tool in Christian polemics.  This is unlike the methodology used by Ibn Ezra and the school of the Babylonian Geonim.  In an extreme, yet very telling example, Rashbam almost explicitly states that the law and textual understanding of scripture are two distinct sciences. He writes:  “Wise people, you should know and understand that I have not come to explain the [practical] laws, even though they are the most important. As I explained in [my commentary to] Genesis, the laws, and homiletical passages, are learned from extra [words or letters] in the text, and you will find some of these in the commentaries of my maternal grandfather, Rashi. However, I have come to explain the simple meaning of the verses. Thus I will explain the laws and the halakhot according to common sense. Nevertheless, the [practical] laws are of primary importance, as our Sages said: “law can uproot Scripture.”  Practical outcomes of this doctrine can be found throughout Rashbam’s commentary.
I am aware that I have merely wet my feet in the vast pool of which questions like this lie. At the very least, the reader should be aware that this subject is immensely complex, and is often oversimplified, or totally ignored by members of Rabbinic and Karaite Judaism. Both schools of thought can be said to be “textual” to some extent. I suppose, as is the case with most matters of law, religion, and philosophy, it is all a matter of perspective. I pray that the reader may act honestly, sincerely, and humbly before The Lord, regardless of legal direction. May it suffice that one walks in a direction altogether, lest we revert to the motto “each man did that which was straight in his eyes.”
סוֹף דָּבָר הַכֹּל נִשְׁמָע אֶת הָאֱלֹהִים יְרָא וְאֶת מִצְוֹתָיו שְׁמוֹר כִּי זֶה כָּל הָאָדָם
 Early Christians were divided on this doctrine. For example, compare Romans 3: 23-26, James 2:14-25.
 Senator Ted Cruz made similar remarks in response to Obergefell v. Hodges: http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ted-cruz-goes-after-supreme-court-judicial-tyranny.
 See also 1 U.S. Code § 106a.
 Mark Levin proposes 10 amendments to be made to the Constitution, which would restrict The Supreme Court of The United States from its current state of unaccountability and legal monopoly: http://www.redstate.com/dhorowitz3/2013/08/13/mark-levins-liberty-amendments/. Rabbinic jurisprudence also maintains objectivity of the law outside what its Supreme Court rules. See Sanhedrin 33.
 Rabbinic records report that our redacted text was composed by Ezra the Scribe and his Court. See Tractate Soferim 6§4, Lieberman, Saul. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, P. 85.
 Geoffrey Chaucer (1343-1400) makes use of this in his Canterbury Tales: “In daunger hadde he at his owene gise/ The yonge girles of the diocise.” In modern English, this translates as “In his own power had he, and at ease/ Young people of the entire diocese.”
 Compare Genesis 23:7, Leviticus 20:4, Berakhot 47b. I believe this turnabout in definition occurred with the events in Ezra 9:1-2.
 Synonymous with the term Scribe, or Prophet. See Targum to 1 Sam. 10:11, 19:20, Jer. 29:1, etc.
 In an anomalous comment, Ibn Ezra seems to adhere to the literal interpretation of Leviticus 11:8, unlike the rabbinic interpretation of the verse (Torat Kohanim 4§9-10).
 See Ḥullin 6a and Arakhin 8b for possible restrictions on non-legal verses as well.
 Compare Gen. 49:10;16, Ex. 18:25-27, Lev. 10:8-20, Deu. 17:9, 33:10. 1 Sam. 8:5, Ezekiel 44:23, and 2 Chron. 19:8-10
 Deu. 17:8-10 establishes a sort of supremacy clause upon lower courts.
 See Acts 23:6. They did not necessarily adhere to rulings of the Sanhedrin in its early days; see http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/12989-sadducees.
 This was the view of Nachmanidies. See his commentary to the Tora (vol. 2, P. 339). Baruch Spinoza alludes to the death of the Jewish nation based on this premise as well, in his preface to his Theological-Political Treatise: “Why were the Hebrews called ‘God’s chosen people’? When I saw that the answer is ‘Because God chose for them a certain land where they could live securely and comfortably’, this taught me that the laws God revealed to Moses were nothing but legislation for the particular State of the Hebrews, that no-one else was obliged to accept them, and indeed that even the Hebrews were bound by them only so long as their State lasted.
 See Rosh Hashana 33 for details.
 Hence, Maimonides states (Sefer Hamiṣvot: rule 2) that any law derived via the hermeneutical rules of rhetoric is not a biblical law, but the interpretations of verses by the Minters of the Law are biblical laws.
 While Exodus 23:1, in line with 2 Chron. 19:8-10, allows judges dissent in a case, they may not follow the dissent after a majority decision is reached (as per Deu. 17:10). See Sanhedrin 68a, Eduyot 5:6 for case examples.
 Non-Semitic minds will often translate their native tongue literally, by replacing the prefix ב with the particle את, used to mark the definite direct object of a transitive verb.
 This notion is first made explicit by Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel (11th century). See Tosafot to Soṭa 33a, s.v kol.
 Explicitly mentioned for the first time in the Mishna. See Meggila 4:6.
 R. Joseph Karo (OḤ:145) is careful to distinguish the justification offered by the Tosafot for abolishing public Targum reading, from the Talmudic law that upholds its reading.
 It goes without saying that just as legal understanding evolves with time, as explained above, so too, Targum varies from location and time.
 Palestinian Talmud (Bikkurim 3§5, Meggila 4§1). See also Eruvin 23b.
 Smalley, Beryl. The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, p. 149-172
 Saadia Gaon so cleverly illustrates this when translating 1 Kings 18:39 to match the Islamic shahada’s phrase “there is no deity but Allah”, which is likely how the Arabic speaking Jews he was addressing would understand the verse.
 Commentary to Exodus 21:1.
 The definition of this legal term, known in Tanaitic texts as halakha le’Moshe mi’sinai, is disputed among the medieval scholars. I believe that the understanding of Samson ben Abraham (commentary to Mishna Eduyot 8§7, Yadayim 4§3, based on the Palestinian Talmud (Orla 3§7), and Babylonian Talmud (Bava Batra 12b) is the more accurate understanding of the term, Halakha Le’Moshe Mi’Sinai.